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Abstract: This study proposes a framework for the allocation of risk in public private partnerships
(PPP) projects. Its contribution lies in the recognition and incorporation of risks introduced by project
stakeholders, and as articulated by the principal-agent theory (PAT). The framework assesses risks and
routes these risks to those parties best equipped to mitigate their impact on the project. This allocation
of risk is facilitated by a thirteen-step process. The practical benefit of this study lies in outlining a
clear, systematic method for allocating risk efficiently to both the government and private enterprise
parties of the project. In so doing, risk mitigation can be expected to improve project performance,
optimize stakeholder goals, and enhance sustainability objectives, including improved operational
life-cycle efficiency and elevated social and community benefits.
Keywords: risk allocation; public private partnerships; PPP; principal-agent theory
1. Introduction
Long term collaboration between the public and the private sector is essential for sustainable
economic growth. It brings better efficiency and sustainability in the delivery of public services by
fostering innovation and private sector financing [1]. However, according to the World Bank, there
is a significant gap between available investment and the investment required for the provision of
services [2]. Public private partnerships (PPPs) are an effective means to fund the growing demand for
infrastructure and services [3] in an environment of limited public funds [4,5]. Yet, while PPPs are now
widely utilized and accepted as a mainstream procurement model, management of their associated
risks remains fraught, with sometime disastrous consequences [6]. The complexity of PPPs, along
with multi-faceted stakeholder involvement and interests, combined with characteristically lengthy
maturity periods, together greatly amplify project risk [7–9]. As a result, management of project risk is
now regarded as a priority in PPP project delivery [7,10,11].
There are of course any variety of methods for parceling out risks, along with the associated
responsibility of managing those risks, to the various stakeholders to a project [12]. Mostly, however,
this process is linked to (financial) compensation in exchange for taking risk on [12]. The underlying
assumption is that risks will be ‘auctioned off’ to whoever can best manage them and consequently
price them lower. Moreover, in this scenario, a project benefits only from risks being fully allocated and
managed, regardless of who it is that takes on the risk [13,14]. The insight provided by principal-agent
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theory (PAT) is that stakeholders to a project—the ones potentially bearing project risk—may not
always, or in every way, share the projects goals. Through the lens of PAT, there exists, therefore,
a disequilibrium between parties to a project in commitment to the project’s success. In allocating
risk, the problem compounds from merely finding who will ‘buy’ the responsibility for managing risk
most cheaply, to one of finding who will ensure risk is mitigated dutifully to the best interests of the
project and not to the self-interest of the risk-holding stakeholder [15]. PPP projects, as large-sized
capital investments, are acutely vulnerable to multi-tier principal-agent complications arising from
an intricate network of multiple government departments in which the private sector as the agent is
enmeshed [15,16].
The conflict of interest between stakeholders to a project and the success of the project itself,
has been extensively discussed in the PAT literature. PPPs, in particular, represent fertile ground
for such an examination since the potential conflicts between project and stakeholders—government
agencies and private companies—are especially pernicious, given the large investment outlays involved
and the extensively lengthy payback periods. Examination of this conflict, however, in PPP projects
has not been widely considered [17]. While private enterprise, as builders and concessionaires of the
project, and government, as procurers and custodians representing the interest of the community,
will together aim to deliver a successful outcome, each party bears additional incentive to extract
gains from the other as well as from the project itself. Specifically, each side looks not only to the
project to maximize profit, but seeks out ways to extract gains from the other side. As an example,
there may be an informational asymmetry regarding the potential severity of a particular project risk.
One side may price the risk cheaply, while the other side, knowing the risk has been underestimated
may let it go to them, even though they were better able to manage the risk [16]. That is, they
save money by not sharing all they know, while endangering the project outcome [13,16,17]. So in
essence, risk management within the context of PPP projects may have been largely overlooked [3,18].
Thus, the application of PAT in risk allocation is both timely and relevant.
While existing studies have highlighted agency problems [13,14,19], and while risk allocation
frameworks do exist [20–22], frameworks that focus directly on solving agency problems via efficient
risk allocation are rare. Exceptions, however, include recent work by Shrestha et al. [17] that use
the PAT approach to analyze risk transfer in PPPs. Drawing from this study, this paper develops a
framework that can be used by parties to a PPP project to negotiate risk allocation at the ex-ante stage
by examining key risk allocation parameters from the risk management literature and subsequently,
analyzing these parameters using a PAT approach.
The significance of this research has both theoretical and practical implications. From the
theoretical perspective, this framework determines the parameters that are essential in the efficient
allocation and transfer of risks in project management endeavors, and thus fills theoretical gaps in
existing knowledge. From the practical perspective, the developed framework can assist PPP partners
in explaining risks applicable to PPP contracts, and provides a stepping-stone that informs all parties
involved in PPPs in the risk negotiation process.
2. Efficient Risk Allocation in PPPs
PPP has been defined as occurring: “where public sector bodies enter into long-term contractual
agreements with private sector entities for the construction or management of public sector
infrastructure facilities by the private sector entity, or the provision of services (using infrastructure
facilities) by the private sector entity to the community on behalf of a public sector entity” [7].
The rationale behind PPPs, and similar applications of private participation in the procurement
of public services, is the view that the private sector, with its superior technical and managerial
abilities, is better placed to deliver a competitive, high-performing, and cheaper, product than is the
government [6]. Moreover, since PPPs involve both the initial building followed by the operation of
the public service project, this procurement method incentivizes the private sector to ensure efficiency
over the whole project lifecycle. Specifically, the builder will avoid cost-cutting short-cuts in the
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building stage that would result in exacerbated costs to the operational stage, since they would only
be cheating themselves [23,24]. In fact, studies show that the construction projects procured under
PPP contracts outperform conventional projects across the board, including in terms of time, quality,
and budget [25,26]. Even so, a persistent problem remains, which is the sub-optimal allocation of risks,
and it is this factor that remains the primary cause of PPP failures [12,27].
Thus, the efficient allocation of project risk stands out as a key challenge in ensuring PPP project
‘success’ [3,5,27–29]. What ‘success’ means, however, needs careful scrutiny, since the parties to
the project—the private firm and government—while sharing the goal of delivering an efficient
working project, will nevertheless differ in other objectives [30,31]. Since, PPPs bring parties together
as partners, it is important that the mechanism for allocating risks is consistent in incentivizing
participants towards achieving the projects common goal, while also allowing each party to realize
their additional objectives [31]. At the extreme, government will seek to transfer all project risk to the
private party, while the private party will seek to maximize premiums charged for taking on those
risks [32]. The interests of the project, however, may be better served by the government retaining
certain risks—those it can better control (such as number of users), while project costs can be expected
to go down where government is better informed about the nature of risks involved, calling out
excessive risk premiums the private sector may be hoping to extract [33].
Though risk matrices are already provided in the tender documents, and while relevant guidelines
and policy provide recommendations on how risks should be allocated, risk allocation negotiations
still occur between the parties before the contracts are finalized. As each project is different and may
involve different risks, the flexibility in the PPP contracts (for example, inclusion of power to order
variations) are also negotiated.
In practice, two anomalies stand out. PPP contracts tend to assign risks to the party least
able to refuse them, and thus often those risks are left to the party least able to manage them [22].
This misallocation of risk remains a significant impediment to PPP success [34]. Awareness of this
problem has given rise to a series of studies examining efficient risk allocation strategies. Ameyaw and
Chan [35] identify thirteen models for allocating risks in PPPs. Essentially, these risk allocation models
seek a compromise in the degrees of success that both the government and the private sector parties
can achieve from PPP projects. In this study, we draw from contract theory to define ‘efficient risk
allocation’ as the assigning of risks to parties of their basis of their ability to best manage the risk [12].
The definition of risks vary in literature. A notable work on the topic by March and Shapira [36]
highlight two main perspectives on the definition of risk: the economic perspective and the managerial
perspective. According to Bahli and Riverd [37], the economic perspective views risk as the variance
of a probability distribution of possible gains and losses associated with a given alternative. From a
managerial perspective, risk is defined as uncertainty that is associated with negative outcomes.
The latter perspective is generally used to define risk in the project management literature. As this
study examines risk from an agency problem perspective, we too will take a defensive approach to
apply a management perspective to examine risk.
Furthermore, we examine the allocation of exogenous risks and endogenous risks. Li et al. [38]
define exogenous risks as those external to the project, i.e., risk events occurring beyond the system
boundaries of a project but whose consequences cross the project boundary to impact upon the project
and its outcomes; and endogenous risk is defined as risk events and their consequences occurring
within the system boundaries of the project. This classification precedent is widely accepted in this
area of research, having been used by several other researchers examining risk allocation in PPP
projects [8,12].
3. Application of the Principal Agent Theory (PAT)
PAT is a mature body of work, which explores the conflicts of interests arising between various
project stakeholders, charged with its procurement, development and management, and with delivering
the stated objectives of the project itself [39]. While both project contractor and client may partner to
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deliver a project outcome, the collaboration may not be an equal one. One side may be more powerful
than the other; in terms of knowledge, skills, influence or finances [40]. Moreover, they may retain
competing interests, and may even take on parasitic roles—syphoning off benefits from the project,
while allowing the project to survive healthily enough to ensure the on-going flow of those benefits.
Thus, the agency problem arises when these competing interests appear. A prominent feature of this
problem is the mal-apportioning of risk to the party least able to resist the risk, leaving the project at
risk of sub-optimal performance.
Principal agent conflicts were first identified by Coase [41], who asked the fundamental question
of why it is that firms exist. Alchian and Demsetz [42] further developed the concept, looking into
property rights and the theory of the firm. In Demsetz’s [43] assessment, neoclassical economics
ignored the problems relating to the structure of property rights and contractual arrangements where
it was assumed that ownership and management resided in a single person. Developments in the
theory of the firm had two themes:
• “a tendency for individuals to pursue their own interest in ways that conflict with the goals of the
team” and,
• “an adjustment of ownership structures and contracts so as to reduce the degree to which team
goals are compromised by this tendency” [43].
PAT centers on two problems: ‘adverse selection’ and ‘moral hazard’ [44]. Firstly, adverse selection
occurs when the principal selects an agent who may not be the most appropriate. In this situation,
the principal will not fully know the ability of the agent; either at time of selection (ex-ante) or while
under contract (ex-post) [45]. Secondly, a moral hazard arises when an agent acts in self-interest to
meet their own goals, doing so at the expense of the principal [46]. Principals cannot readily identify
manifestations of moral hazard, due to a lack of accessible information (they cannot monitor the
day-to-day activities of their agent.) Moral hazards are exemplified by private companies lowering
product quality to reduce production costs, or in lobbying government to grant higher subsidies.
PAT aims at resolving these issues [45].
A convincing case may be made for applying transaction cost economics (TCE) theory in PPP risk
allocation due to the strategic and opportunistic behaviors involved in PPPs. Incomplete PPP contracts
in lengthy and uncertain environments generally require renegotiations which can result in high
transaction costs. While transaction cost theory and PAT essentially focus on similar issues, using PAT
as a lens is justified as it focuses more on the relationship between the principal and the agent, whereas
transaction cost theory focuses on individual transitions. The literature suggests serious issues relating
to the trust between the government and the private sector in PPPs [47] and focus on the relationship
aspect is a priority, given its capacity to reduce risks via efficient allocation of responsibilities [48].
PAT focuses more on incentive alignment and monitoring to reduce information asymmetry while TCE
focuses more on ex post governance mechanisms to solve the issues of bounded rationality and asset
specificity. Moreover, the governance problem in TCE is not to protect the rights of the end-users, but to
accomplish effective transactions. On the other hand, PAT examines the problem of private sector
self-interest that may compromise social benefits. The PAT approach is thus more relevant to PPPs.
Governments use PPPs as a low-cost vehicle to promote economic development and social
welfare maximization [3]. Private firms, however, will not share these goals as a priority. Rather, they
are motivated by profit and consequently can be expected to promote efficiency over effectiveness.
Typically, they aim at reducing expenses, often by cutting costs, which in turn can compromise
outcomes [45]. The dilemma of PPP project procurement is that while private participation offsets
procurer cost burdens, it also places the private partner in significant control of the project, inviting
actions that siphon off benefits to the project contractor at the expense of the procurer, whose interests
they are supposed to serve [14].
Strategies for safeguarding public interest in PPP contracts is important for governments as public
interest is treated as something that promotes social welfare and is considered synonymous with
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public policy [49]. For the government, a successful delivery of PPP should demonstrate value for
money (VfM) benefits. Though we assume that the government principals act in the public interest,
we cannot discard the fact that they also have their own self-interest. An important agenda for the
government principal is also to be re-elected. PPPs are generally large capital intensive projects that
attract the attention of taxpayers, and public dissatisfaction can cost governments their future votes.
This can lead to government opportunism which can be dangerous for the agent and for the project
itself. For example, the government may not support flexibility on pricing prior to election, even when
the prices are set below cost recovery levels.
Moreover, it needs to be noted that mainstream PAT focus on the moral hazard problem, however,
as De Palma et al. [13] highlights, one of the drawbacks of PAT is that it ignores the opportunism of
the principal. Shrestha et al. [31] proposed the idea of a balanced risk allocation model in a principal
agent environment where both the government and the concessionaire aim at attaining their own
goals to increase their respective utility level (Figure 1). Undertaking risk responsibilities in a balanced
manner can create a successful partnership for both the parties involved [31,50,51]. However, where
there is an information advantage for one party, it may attempt to increase its utility at the expense of
its partner. When this occurs, the balance is disrupted and likelihood of achieving project success is
diminished [13]. Thus, PPP contracts should be designed and negotiated to encourage both parties to
achieve a win-win balance through the efficient allocation of risks and responsibilities [31].
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Figure 1. Role of risk allocation to achieve win- win balance [31]. Note: SPV: Special purpose vehicle;
Gov: Government.
Therefore, the risk allocation framework presented herein aims to realize this by focusing upon the
win–win risk allocation balance between the government and the private sector. Moreover, according
to Zhang et al. [52], the correct approach to develop such fra eworks requires a study grounded in the
“very fundamental and time-honored theories” that it relates to. As a result, this research explores the
core concepts of risk allocation principles through the theoretical lens of PAT.
4. Research Method
This study’s defined objective is pursued through explanation building, by conducting a
comprehensive literature revi w in accordance with the typo ogy f review studies proposed by
Paré et al. [53]. Such revi ws seeks to m ke a contribution to the world of practice, by providing
prescriptive guidelin s to indus ry and pra titioners. The aim of the review is to draw upon
existing studies to d n ify, e c ibe, and find application of principles in a real-world c t t [53].
Literature reviews add value to the body of k owledge of topics not fully developed as PPP risk
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allocation, since the process of synthesizing existing disparate information into comprehensive
relationships allows for the development of prescriptive framework building with applicability to
real-world situations [54].
A literature review was undertaken on the risks in PPP projects. Companion publications in the
field were examined to the point of saturation, using a ‘snowballing literature search’ [55]. This resulted
in the identification of 83 relevant published studies. Journals proved to be the richest source on
PPP risk allocations, with the International Journal of Project Management; Journal of Construction
Engineering & Management; Journal of Infrastructure Systems; Journal of Engineering Construction
& Architectural management; Journal of Construction Management & Economics; Utilities Policy;
and Sustainability offering the largest collections. Books, book chapters, and technical reports on risk
allocation, risk uncertainty, and the theory of incentives, were also retrieved. While structured review
studies aim at providing a snapshot picture of the current state of a topic, theoretical review studies
must draw on a wider range of published literature in order to capture the fullness of the debate [55],
and this was the approach taken here.
Contribution of a study in construction management discipline can be assessed within its originality
in development of knowledge, as well as, its impacts on practice [56,57]. In view of these two primary
criteria, the contribution of the present study to the field is considered to be justified, for the most
part, in terms of its implications for practice. Moreover, integrating the literature explores solutions
to a real problem. The best types of studies that integrate the literature are those that add value to
new thinking, and have relevance to the change of real-life behaviors to address a real need in the
field. The contribution of the prescriptive framework presented here is therefore justified given that
it presents new relationships, processes, and perspectives that have not been fully explored, a point
argued by Torraco [58].
5. Defining the Parameters of Risk Allocation
There are several steps involved in the PPP risk allocation process. Initially, it is the private sector
that assesses and prices project risks, with this pricing reflected in the tender bid to government.
In evaluating received bids, government will consider whether any of the identified risks can be
transferred, and at what price. Ultimately, risks (and the compensation for bearing those risks), will
typically be negotiated between parties, with a final agreement put in place on how the various project
risks will be shared. According to the literature, in this regard, two main criteria prevail:
• Risk should reside with the party best able to mitigate the risk; and
• Risk should be transferred to the party who prices the risk at the lowest cost [27,59–61].
This principle is one developed from the perspective of viewing risk in economic terms: the
party able to reduce risk more cheaply will be willing to take less compensation for bearing that
risk. Consequently, in PPP projects, the prevailing wisdom is that the party to the agreement with
the greatest capacity to reduce the likelihood of a risk eventuating, and to deal with it best should it
eventuate, is the party to whom the risk should be allocated. Being the best able to mitigate a risk,
in economic terms, equates with being able to mitigate that risk, and/or manage the consequences,
at the lowest relative cost [27,61].
In defining principles of risk allocation in construction projects, Max Abrahamson [62] defines five
criteria; commonly known as the Abrahamson’s principles. Abrahamson recommends the assignation
of risk to a particular party where:
• It is in their control;
• It can be transferred as an economic transaction;
• The transfer accrues an economic benefit;
• Doing so creates greater overall efficiency; and
• Should the risk eventuate, the consequences do indeed fall on the party owning the risk.
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Extending this thesis, Arrow [63] analyzed risk allocation from a market transaction perspective,
concluding that information as to the nature of a risk influences attitudes of both the buyer and seller
with regard to the willingness to accept risk. Posner and Rosenfield [64] went on to establish the
proposed identification of the preferred risk bearer to a contract: “(The) superior risk bearer is to be
understood here as the party that is the more efficient bearer of the particular risk in question, in the
particular circumstances of the transaction.” [64]. They define the superior risk bearer as possessing
greater ability in terms of:
• Minimizing the risk probability;
• Minimizing the degree of loss suffered, either before or after the risk event occurs; and
• Insuring against any residual risk that cannot be feasibly avoided.
In short, efficient risk allocation, as posited by the literature, identifies three parameters:
• Control;
• Information; and
• Incentives; discussed below, from the perspective of PAT in relation to PPPs.
5.1. Parameter 1: Control
In accordance with Abrahamson’s principles [62] and the superior risk bearer theory [64], the party
bearing any risk should also be in control of that risk, having sufficient ability to reduce both
the probability and severity of the risk. Indeed, control is a well-established criterion in PPP risk
allocation [10,12,21], and encompasses the ability to efficiently mitigate risk through outright prevention
or through negative impact reduction, should the risk manifest [61].
However, in accordance with PAT, the principal must also ensure that the transferred risks are
efficiently neutralized by the agent. Thus, the bid evaluation process, amongst the usual considerations,
must also establish the capacity of the agent to control risks [31]. This capacity can be gauged by
government during the tendering process by asking potential agents to include information in their
bid on the costs for project delivery, cash flow and profit forecast, and the price for taking on risks [65].
Specifically, risk costings will be reflected in the bid price, and signal to the principal risk mitigation
capabilities and the capacity to augment projected VfM [17].
Once the agent is nominated, the control parameter should be carefully assessed with regard to
the allocation of risks between the principal and the agent. If at this stage the risks are not efficiently
allocated, the moral hazard problem at the ex-post stages can be expected [19].
5.2. Parameter 2: Information
De Palma et al. [13] developed a risk allocation system for PPPs, using a principal agent based
typology, proposing that risk allocation should be based on the level of information that companies
and the government have available to them regarding risk. Triantis [66] reiterates that information
is an essential consideration when allocating risks in contracts. These insights, together with Posner
and Rosenfield’s theory [64] of the superior risk bearer, reveal that the superior risk bearer is indeed
the party with the superior information on the risks; specifically, with regard to assessment of risk
probability, severity, as well as efficient allocation and mitigation.
Obtaining accurate risk related information aids in the evaluation of risks during the assessment
stage. The party with inadequate information, or misinformation, will be at a disadvantage in regards
to the value they place on a risk, which will result in an inadequate project bid. This type of error is
known as internal uncertainty [67]. Similarly, a party’s ability to control risks is contingent on their
ability to acquire accurate risk-related information, and then to use it to assess risks [66].
Information asymmetry at ex ante stages leads to the adverse selection problem. Moreover, the lack
of information or the inability to understand it complicates the rational risk assessment [13,68–70].
One of the risk management guidelines in ISO 31000 [71] clearly highlights that the management of risks
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should explicitly consider any limitations of unavailable information for a party to take responsibility
of the risk.
At the ex-post stages, lack of information on project operations and performance leads to moral
hazard [17]; to be more specific, the private sector can easily conceal their opportunistic actions in the
presence of asymmetric information [72]. So, an aspect of monitoring that favors PPPs is the ease of
measuring the performance via output standards [73], though standards put in place need to be clearly
defined, measurable in quantitative and qualitative terms, and verifiable by third parties like courts or
arbitrators [33]. The easier it is to measure performance, the lower the risk of the agent avoiding their
responsibilities [45], and stronger the incentive for the private sector to perform [17].
5.3. Parameter 3: Incentives
Laffont and Vickrey [74] define ‘incentives’ as “the design of rules and institutions for inducing
economic agents to exert a high level of effort (in the broad sense), and to reveal truthfully all socially
relevant information they might have.” Abrahamson’s principles assert that the incentives to manage
risks ought to be a criterion driving the allocation of risks. Similarly, Iossa et al. [33] point out that the
primary objective of risk allocation is to provide incentives to both the private sector and government,
to manage risks. Hölmstrom [75] also analyses risk sharing, arguing that the principal must expose the
agent to some levels of risk in order to motivate them. It is the mechanism of incentives that prod
agents into effective risk mitigation [76–78].
6. The Risk Allocation Framework
Figure 2 presents the developed framework, using a step-by-step process. It reveals the rationale
for determining efficient risk allocation. The framework guides the process of risk assignation to one of
either parties, or to a sharing of risk between parties. The outcome is an efficient allocation of project
risk [52].
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6.1. Project Company’s Ability to Influence risks
Step 1 of the framework establishes the criteria determining whether the private sector has the
ability to influence the level of risk. The party that has the ability to influence a risk will also be
in a position to prevent, or minimize, the negative impacts of that risk [21,79]. Controlling the risk
before it manifests is consistent with the ability of the party to reduce the probability and severity of
the risk. This applies particularly to endogenous risks. With such risks, the risk bearing party can
instigate preventative measures before the risk materializes, eliminating the risk entirely, or at least
reducing probability of occurrence [33]. Essential to the assessment, however, is an audit of the risk
bearer’s ability to take actions effective at reducing the risk impact. Reducing the impact applies for
both exogenous risks and endogenous risks. This can be done via proper risk management planning,
and by having back-up plans or contingency plans. For example, exogenous risks such as inflation may
require mitigation measures that may include indexing revenues to inflation, fixed price contracting,
etc.; such strategies reduce the potential impacts [27].
6.2. Project Company’s Information Regarding Risks
Step 2 of the framework highlights information. For a party to comprehend the risks and to put
together an effective risk management plan, information is needed. Estimating the likelihood of risks,
and predicting the damage they can cause, is critical to effective risk management. Information will
also bear on a party’s ability to control risks [66]. Consequently, an assessment is needed to confirm that
the private sector does have the necessary information. Here, information sharing between parties is
needed, and the government, as custodians of the project, will have information pertinent to the private
party [13,33]. Though the private sector superiority in regards to having endogenous risk information
is taken as a given, the government may in fact be more informed on some endogenous risks such
as regulatory changes, processes and permits and land acquisition. Moreover, better information
on the project may be provided to potential bidders prior to tendering to facilitate in a better risk
assessment [17].
6.3. Incentives for Project Company to Manage Risks
Steps 3 and 4 of the framework set out the criteria for incentives. This should be an important
criterion to assess risk allocation. Risks should only be allocated to the private sector if they have
the incentives to manage them. Thus, Step 3 determines if the private sector has (and will continue
to have) the incentive to manage project risk, and Step 4 assesses if the government can provide the
private sector with incentives to manage risk.
PPPs include an inherent mechanism to provide the private sector with the incentive to perform
as their performance is interrelated with their financial return accrued [23], which incentivizes the
private sector to control risks more efficiently. However, when there is a lack of ex-post competition
and where the service fees are remunerated by the governments, there are fewer incentives for the
private sector to perform, which then may lead to the moral hazard problem [17]. To prevent moral
hazard occurring, incentives can be provided (or in some cases, imposed) to the private sector by the
government. Incentives could either be negative incentives or positive incentives.
Providing the private sector with the right incentives can motivate them, but a key issue that
needs to be examined yet again is whether the risk transfer using incentives is cheaper for governments
compared to the costs of bearing the risks themselves. For endogenous risks, incentives can be more
easily designed. For example, Shrestha et al. [17] demonstrated the use of incentives to transfer
project related risks such as output/service standards via penalties for non-performance and delays;
requirement of performance guarantees and bonds; and compulsory insurance to be taken up by the
private sector, etc. Additionally, explicit performance standards in the contracts help reduce transaction
costs. However, when risks are exogenous, then transferring risks via incentives will lead to an
excessive risk premium [33]. So here, the only reason to transfer risk (or share it) is to this motivate the
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agent to increase the expected value of the project through increased effort. Governments also provide
positive incentives to increase competition. When high-powered incentives to bear certain risks brings
about an efficient risk mitigation, particularly when monitoring is difficult (or costly), then these risks
can be transferred. However, if the private sector does not have the incentives to manage the risks
and if/when the government cannot design the right incentives for the private sector to manage these
risks, then there is strong chance that moral hazard will occur when the risks are transferred. It is
therefore more efficient for the risks to be allocated to the government or shared between the two
parties. Moreover, there is strong indication in literature that support the use of real options as a viable
approach for predetermined risk sharing mechanisms which allows the parties to anticipate their costs
of bearing (sharing) the risks [80] while creating opportunities that risks create at the ex post stages by
incorporating renegotiations clauses [81].
6.4. Project Company’s Ability to Bear the Consequence of Risks
Step 5 of the framework considers control and focuses on the private sector’s ability to bear the
consequences of the risk. When the private sector cannot bear the consequence of risks, the project will
most likely suffer and the risks re-transferred back to the government. This may be particularly true
for exogenous risks, where the ability to directly influence them is minimal and control depends upon
the private sector’s capability to endure the impacts of the risks without going insolvent. Failures in
larger scale PPP projects generate social risks; therefore, governments must select a private company
that is well equipped to control risks that occur. This is an important measure to mitigate the adverse
selection problem. Good tendering practices along with strong and transparent competition allows
better information signaling from bidders that determine the capability of the potential agents to
manage risks [17,23,82]. Project companies can spread the cost of exogenous risk among a number of
shareholders and/or among a diverse portfolio of projects [83].
6.5. Project Company’s Ability to Transfer Risks
Step 6 once again investigates control by establishing criteria regarding the private sector’s ability
to transfer risks to third parties; such criteria is inextricably linked to Abrahamson’s principle and
Posner and Rosenfield’s superior risk bearer theory. Hence, when it is known that the private sector
cannot bear the consequences of a certain risk, then an evaluation is necessary to determine whether
the private sector can transfer these risks to third parties. Many of the endogenous risks are transferred
to third party entities by the project company via closed contracts with contractors and operators for
construction and operation risks [27]. Some exogenous risk are transferred to third party insurances.
For the private sector, transferring both exogenous and endogenous risks to third parties is an important
risk mitigation measure and their ability to do so is based upon their project experience along with the
familiarity and understanding of risks. Again, ex-ante competition may be important in ascertaining
this ability of the private sector.
6.6. Government’s Ability to Acquire Ex-post Information
Step 7 concerns the government’s ability to acquire information regarding how/if the private
sector efficiently manages the risks assigned to them at the project’s ex-post stages. This step is
important because it focuses on reducing information asymmetry. Even when all the previous criteria
are met, the government must secure evidence on how the risks are being managed (or if managed
at all). Failure to do so will mean that assigning risks to the private sector will not result in efficient
risk allocation.
Monitoring the private sector’s performance is essential to ensuring that the risk remains
transferred. It not only reduces information asymmetry, but output specific monitoring also sets up
incentives for the private sector to provide information to the government which can be important in
transferring risks at the ex-post stages.
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6.7. Risk Mitigation by Project Company
Step 8 concerns risk mitigation by the private sector. The framework focuses on how the private
sector mitigates risks allocated to it. At this stage, it is determined that the private sector is the
superior risk bearer and based on the superior risk bearer theory, the private sector can mitigate
risks efficiently either by reducing the probability/severity of the risks or by transferring risk to third
parties. The most suitable way to mitigate risks can vary depending on the project situation and the
private sectors’ preference regarding which technique to employ. Selecting the most appropriate risk
mitigation involves balancing the costs and efforts of implementation against the benefits derived [71].
Governments can however, require the private sector to mitigate (some) risks in a pre-determined
manner as an incentive provision strategy [17]. This may be done via third party transfer such as
mandatory insurance on certain risk items, or risk reduction by having systems in place allowing
governments to sign off on decisions (such as selecting third party contractors).
6.8. Government’s Information on Risks and Agency Problems
If the previous criteria in Steps 4, 6 and 7 to transfer risk are not satisfied, the government must
consider bearing these risks themselves (and assess their ability to control the risks) to achieve an
efficient outcome. Thus, the framework is developed further by setting out criteria to assist in the
government’s decision making process. Steps 9 and 10 of the framework assesses if the government
possesses or can acquire the information needed to manage the risks. Governments are more likely to
be less informed on risks compared to private sector companies. Possessing information in regards to
the risks materializing is an important criterion for governments to be able to bear risks. Moreover, risks
are interrelated and the occurrence of one risk can lead to the other [6], so understanding these risk
relationships is equally important. Without information, the government may end up bearing risks
which they cannot control, and with this their credibility is diminished and transferring risk to the
private sector becomes more expensive—a so called ‘social risk’.
6.9. Government’s Ability to Bear Risks
Step 11 determines whether the government can bear the consequences of the risks if they occur.
While the private sector may be better suited to manage endogenous risks [27], it is generally argued
that the government has more control over exogenous risks [38]. However, governments bearing
sole responsibility to manage all exogenous risks can prove very costly and diminish the benefits of
PPPs. Furthermore, when governments take on some risks, it may turn out to be inefficient resulting
from their lack of risk management skills. The government needs to avoid costly errors to limit social
risks [31]. When both parties have insufficient capacity to influence the risk (mostly in the case of
exogenous risks), the best option is to share the risk [38,79]. Hence, risks must be negotiated and
shared through a risk sharing mechanism between the two parties.
6.10. Government’s Commitment to Bear Risks
Step 12 of the framework sets the criteria regarding government’s commitment to bear the risk.
Government’s credibility in managing their share of risks is often questioned and perceived as a
major issue for private sectors involved in PPPs [14,84,85]. Often, major disputes or renegotiations
may occur as a result of government’s failure to commit, subsequently leading to higher transaction
costs. It is therefore quintessentially important that governments commit to assume responsibility and
keep promises made in the contract by bearing the risks that are allocated to them. As government
opportunism is not uncommon in PPPs, the contract should ensure government commitment through
clear price adjustment formulas, clear mechanisms for risk sharing, and reliable dispute resolution
systems [17], and in some cases, call and put options [86]. These provide positive incentives to the
private sector. These incentives also add to the government’s credibility and reduce uncertainties from
exogenous risks.
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6.11. Sharing the Risk
Finally, Step 13 considers risk sharing between the two parties—which can be in equal proportions
or at varying proportions depending on the risk condition and how the contract is designed.
Though, deciding on risk sharing mechanisms may again involve negotiations resulting in unresolved
allocation. Notably, if the private sector has been already selected when this framework is applied, then,
a shift in the bargaining power between the parties may have occurred. Due to the absence of (further)
competition, there is less incentive for the private sector to take on risks. Consequently, a moral
hazard problem leading to a hold-up may occur [87]. Whilst conversely, the government may not
find it necessary to provide any positive incentives, since they do not have the pressure of selling
the project when the private sector is already selected. In this case, opportunism on the part of the
government may occur which can lead to inefficient risk transfer and subsequently, higher transaction
cost. Therefore, it might be necessary at this stage to allocate risks on the basis of the information (in
regards to efficient risk allocation) assessed during the previous steps of the framework.
Risks can be shared using various mechanisms depending on the nature of the risks, the market
conditions, as well as the principal agent environment in which there the negotiation takes place.
For risks that are affected by exogenous factors, the risk sharing mechanism may involve revenue
guarantees, interest rate guarantees, guarantees on force majeure events, and in some cases, guarantees
on the demand for services. These guarantees can take the form of reimbursements, subsidies, price
adjustments, extension of concession period, or termination arrangements. Real options approach can
often be found in these risk sharing mechanisms to incorporate the flexibilities [86]. However, when
the guarantees are not set well, they can create serious issues, specifically for the governments [88].
There have been several studies that calculate the optimal levels of predefined guarantees—revenue
guarantees [88], interest rate guarantees [80], and the determination of the concession period [51].
However, it is critical for the governments to have accurate information to use these models; this brings
us back to the government information parameter in steps 9 and 10 of the risk allocation framework.
On a different note, risks sharing may also be designed based on relational contracts where both
parties can jointly manage risks rather than allocating them to one party [89]. An alliance agreement
can be made between the government and private sector companies in good faith, where both commit
to work cooperatively, sharing the project’s risk and rewards in order to achieve the stated outcomes.
In addition, government can provide incentives via pain share-gain share mechanisms, where both the
costs and rewards of the risks can be shared between the two parties.
7. Conclusions
This study offers two main contributions to the management of risk in PPP projects. First, existing
risk frameworks aim to identify risks, and then only to recommend how those risks should be allocated.
The framework proposed here extends this objective through a deeper understanding of risk afforded
by PAT, to ensure those risks are more completely identified and then optimally allocated across the
whole of the PPP project lifecycle.
Secondly, in theoretical terms, this study merges standard risk allocation theory with PAT. In so
doing, it extends both the understanding of project risk by incorporating social dynamic factors
with probabilistic uncertainty, while providing a guided approach to determining where and with
whom those risks should be assigned. Specifically, this framework provides a rational mechanism for
determining whether any specific risk should be borne by the private or governmental partner in the
project, or shared.
There are clear implications from the framework, both initially during risk allocation negotiations
and subsequently, during operations. That is, the framework provides a guiding tool at each step of the
project, allowing both the government and private sector to access the equitability of allocating risks
a certain way. At the ex-post stages, the framework can be applied periodically to determine if risk
allocations remain equitable. The application of the framework is particularly salient where the nature
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of the risks change over time and re-negotiation of risk allocation are called for. Indeed, the framework
itself presents a mechanism by which such risk reviews and renegotiations may be facilitated.
The practical benefit of allocating risks more efficiently is self-evident. On the project side, firstly,
the probability of risks materializing can be expected to reduce. Moreover, should risks eventuate,
they can be more effectively managed and their negative impacts contained. These benefits can be
expected to translate into cost-reductions and performance improvements over the life of the project.
Secondly, for the stakeholders—the government and the private sector—improved risk allocation
facilitates smoother cooperation between interested parties, and reduced conflicts of interest between
those parties and that of the project itself.
One of the limitations of this study is the use of a rather defensive approach that focuses on
the downside of risks. Risks can have a positive or a negative impact on the project. However, this
study generally focused on the negative aspects of risks to solve the issues related principal agent
relationship. Future research may further this framework by incorporating risk mitigation parameters
that facilitate in enhancing positive risks or in the sharing of risks.
Moreover, this framework is the result of the integration of numerous studies in the field, and as
such, while rigorous in its comprehensive inclusion of known parameters affecting risk identification
and allocation, has yet to be validated. Such validation is the necessary next step and should be carried
out using a case study approach in a live PPP contextual setting. Additional lines of future research
may include:
Future research directions may also include:
• Assessing stakeholder capacity to mitigate various risk categories;
• Determining triggers and events by which risks best borne by one particular party shift to be
optimally borne by another;
• Extending the pricing of risk to incorporate the pricing of risk information asymmetry;
• Exploration of PPP contract development that recognizes PAT and its impact on risk allocation,
with the view to limiting the opportunities and incentives to extract advantage by any one party
at the expense of exacerbating project risk factors, while also optimizing risk allocations between
contracting parties.
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